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INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION
The 2014 Ukraine crisis has significantly changed relations throughout the global
community, specifically between Russia and the United States. Although their tense relationship
continued following the end of the Cold War, the crisis signified an important shift in
international relations and Russia’s economic role in the global market. The sanctions issued by
the Obama administration represent a strong initiative to condemn Russia’s invasion and
annexation of the Crimea while pursuing the US’s political interests abroad. Furthermore, the
four executive orders exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction given their control over multinational
transactions, including foreign entities and persons. Several years after the first US sanctions
were implemented, the Russian energy and financial sectors are showing negative effects such as
profit loss, interruption of projects and devaluation of the ruble, Russia’s currency. Additionally,
many of the current issues have potential for long term effects that have already initiated a shift
in Russia’s economic and political structure domestically as internationally.
My question for this research paper is how the sanctions have impacted Russia’s
economic development since the country has been unable to access Western capital.
Furthermore, I will explore how this development has influenced Russia’s involvement in global
legal issues, particularly in its strengthening partnership with China. Since the sanctions were
enforced, the energy sector has explored opportunities for recovery and is establishing closer
trading ties with countries outside of Europe and the US. On the contrary, the US dollar
dominates the global market, making it difficult for Russian banks and companies to access
Western capital for corporate debt payments, loans and approved domestic and international
transactions. The prevalence of the dollar in Russia’s economy implicates the US’s ability to
extend laws and regulations abroad. Consequently, the Ukraine crisis extends beyond Russia’s

invasion of the Crimea region by illustrating the US’s strong authority in the international
market. On the other hand, it is this authority that has also pushed Russia to “pivot” towards
China economically and politically, creating a new global arena.
BACKGROUND
The 2014 Ukraine crisis occurred as a result of protests that were fueled by the actions of
former Ukraine President Viktor Yanukovych. On November 21, 2013, Yanukovych suspended
negotiations with the EU regarding a deal called the “Eastern Partnership” which would have
opened trade and political relations with Europe, promoting inclusion and modernization. 1
Russia’s strong opposition to the deal resulted in substantial influence that eventually caused its
abruption. Ukraine’s strategic location between Russia and Europe makes it a significant factor
in international security issues and is also part of the US’s foreign policy interests to integrate it
into international institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Consequently, the
nationwide protests immediately alarmed the international community, specifically Russia, the
EU, and the US. After Yanukovych fled to Moscow, Russian troops, that claimed to be local
self-defense groups, were spotted on the Ukrainian border. They eventually entered the country
and seized airports and government buildings around Crimea, a predominantly Russian speaking
region of Ukraine.2 Pro-Russian figures held a referendum on March 16, 2014 which claimed
that 97% of the voters in Crimea wanted to join Russia.3 Several days later, Russian President
Vladimir Putin signed a treaty that annexed Crimea.
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Russia’s involvement sparked outrage among the Western powers and international
institutions. On March 17, 2014, Obama condemned Russia’s actions stating that “Ukraine’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected, and international law must be
upheld….the referendum in Crimea was a clear violation of Ukrainian constitutions and
international law, and it will not be recognized by the international community.”4 Putin defended
Russia’s actions by claiming that their help was requested by the Ukrainian government. The
US’s strict sanctions have clearly demonstrated the Obama administration’s strong initiative to
act on the matter in relation to foreign policy interests. Now, several years after the first
sanctions were implemented, Russian energy companies and financial institutions are recovering
but still experiencing negative effects. Companies are losing profits, projects are being forced to
stop and financial transactions using Western capital are prohibited. Furthermore, Russia’s
economy has taken a significant downturn as the ruble has vastly depleted in value while oil
prices are contributing to loss of revenue. However, the future of the energy and financial sectors
is uncertain since energy companies are now partnering with other countries, such as China, for
trade and long term project commitments while the financial sector is having a difficult time
recovering due to prohibited access to the dollar.
THE SANCTIONS
A. Executive Orders 13660, 13661, 13662, and 13685
The Russian sanctions in response to the 2014 Ukraine crisis consist of four different
rounds. Executive Orders 13660, 13661, 13662, and 13685 were signed by President Obama on
March 6, March 17, March 20, and December 19, 2014, respectively. 5 There are two types of
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sanctions: Special Designated Nationals, which means that all transactions and activity is
prohibited with the listed individuals and entities; and Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List,
which means that special projects and transactions are prohibited with the listed individuals and
entities.6 For example US persons or anyone under US jurisdiction, cannot participate in
“significant transactions” with specific individuals, such as Igor Sechin, and entities, such as
Bank Rossiya which both fall under the SDN’s list. As for the SSIL, US persons or anyone under
US jurisdiction cannot conduct specific transactions and projects, such as deep water oil drilling,
with Russian energy companies such as Gazprom and Rosneft. Collectively, the sanctions target
specific individuals of Putin’s inner circle and entities that had direct or indirect involvement in
the Ukraine crisis by limiting or prohibiting their access to Western markets. Through the
findings of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Treasury Department, several
of the entities include major energy companies and financial institutions such as Novatek,
Sberbank and VTB Bank.7 The operations of the entities and individuals involved expand across
multinational borders, specifically Europe. The legality of the sanctions is in compliance with the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) which authorizes the President to:
regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any
acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,
transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising
any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving,
any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any
interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.8
Kerry Contini and Jasper Helder, “Keeping Up Compliance: US and EU Sanctions on Russia”
(presentation , Compliance with Russian Sanctions Conference, Washington D.C., April 9, 2015).
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In the context of the Ukraine crisis, this brings up the legal issue of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. This is particularly controversial since the sanctions, in relation to the IEEPA, apply
to foreign persons and entities that operate internationally, such as Gazprom which has
operations based in Europe, the Middle East and several other countries. In 1996, the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, otherwise known as the "Helms-Burton
Act," brought up the question of determining the extent of economic sanctions when they are
applied to US companies doing business abroad and foreign branches conducting businesses with
US persons or US controlled businesses.9 One of the main issues arose when a Wal-Mart
subsidiary in Canada claimed that the sanctions imposed on Cuba by the US violated the concept
of sovereign rights. The Wal-Mart subsidiary was told that it was prohibited from buying Cuban
products since it was operating under the control of a US based entity. 10 The US’s use of
extraterritorial jurisdiction demonstrated the issue of interference in foreign affairs of sovereign
states. Similarly, the Russian sanctions use extraterritorial jurisdiction to impose authority over
foreign individuals, entities and ultimately states.
B. Justification for Jurisdiction
The intricacies of international business also expand into the scope of jurisdiction over
subsidiaries. Some of the most common bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction are the effects
doctrine and nationality principle.11 The effects doctrine authorizes a state to exercise jurisdiction
over individuals and activities occurring outside the state's territorial limits because of illegal or
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unacceptable practices within another state.12 However, as the global community becomes more
economically interdependent, territorial boundaries have become difficult to define legally. The
nationality principle authorizes a state to have jurisdiction over its nationals regardless of their
location.13 The correlation between these justifications demonstrates a significant ambiguity that
is capable of giving a state authorization almost without limits. Section 1(a) of the Executive
Orders states that “all property and interests in property that are in the United States, that
hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or
control of any United States person (including any foreign branch) of the following persons are
blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.”14 The
nationality principle is evident since any US citizen is subject to the order, thus suggesting that
their location does not matter. Since defining territory no longer simply constitutes simply
identifying geographical borders, this leaves almost a limitless jurisdiction of how the sanctions
can be applied.
In Executive Order 13660, Obama stated that Russia’s actions in Ukraine have
“constituted an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the
United States, and I hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat in regards to the
Ukraine crisis.”15 The applicability of the effects doctrine further makes extraterritorial
jurisdiction vague since the limits of how the executive authority will “deal” with the threat are
not specified. This is dangerous as it blurs the distinction in handling legal parameters in
situations such as having jurisdiction over a domestic company as opposed to a foreign
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subsidiary. The repercussions of such obscurity occurred in 1982 when the US established an
export embargo on the Soviet Union that included the prohibition of foreign subsidiaries of US
companies from directly and indirectly selling oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union.16
THE EFFECTS
A. Energy Sector
Russia’s economy is very commodity driven and its energy sector accounts for nearly
25% of its GDP.17 The energy sector makes up nearly 68% of Russia’s export sales. Its main
exports are oil and natural gas, accounting for more than 50% of the federal budget tax revenues.
Additionally, many of Russia’s wealthiest businessmen, such as Igor Sechin who is the CEO of
Rosneft, hold strong influence over the government. Russia’s significant reliance on the energy
sector for revenue makes the integration of government and business inevitable. Consequently,
stability of the energy sector is vital for national prosperity as Russia seeks to explore and
expand, specifically in oil and gas production. Russia’s biggest trading partner is the EU which
receives 53.1% of Russia’s total exports every year, while the US accounts for only 2.7%. 18
However, companies such as ExxonMobil, Chevron, Schlumberger and Halliburton have
established vast relations with Russia’s energy sector including Exxon’s 20 year presence in the
Russian market that has contributed to over $50 billion annual investments coming from US
energy companies.19 Although the energy market has been volatile since 2014, experts predict
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that oil will continue to recover and reach $52.2/bbl which is expected to contribute to economic
growth of 1.5% in 2017.20
Although the US accounts for a small portion of Russia’s exports, Russia’s top energy
companies such as Gazprom and Rosneft have become reliant on American technology and
financial support in sustaining and expanding projects concerning oil and gas. In 2012,
ExxonMobil and Rosneft signed an agreement to share technology and “expertise.” Part of this
included forming a joint venture to explore offshore oil and gas in the Kara Sea and the Black
Sea.21 The following year ExxonMobil and Rosneft expanded their partnership by announcing
their plan to “conquer the Arctic for oil and gas” as well as a deal to start a pilot project for
development of oil reserves in Western Siberia’s shale basins in which Rosneft held a 51% stake
and Exxon held a 49% stake. Simultaneously, Russia and the US were in talks of signing a
package of trade agreements to increase their bilateral relationship.22 Another important
relationship is Chevron’s investment in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, a multibillion dollar
project that began construction in 2011 and now transports crude oil from western Kazakhstan to
a designated terminal in the Black Sea.23 US based companies such as Halliburton and
Schlumberger have also been vast participants in Russia’s energy sector, serving as top oilfield
services providers in Russia’s expansion of oil and gas exploration. Russia accounts for 4 – 5%
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of Halliburton sales and 5 – 6% of Schlumberger’s.24 Halliburton even cemented its presence in
Russia when it opened up an employee training facility there in 2007.
Russia’s reliance on energy exports has made it vulnerable to the sanctions as projects
have had to stop from not being able to get financing and technology. Although the fall of oil
prices following the sanctions ensured their effect, the purpose of the executive orders was to
stop Russian exploration of deep water, Arctic and shale reserves. Various companies, including
Ronseft and Gazprom, were included in the Directives 1 through 4 expansions under Executive
Order 13662 in September 2014.25
the following activities by a U.S. person or within the United States are prohibited,
except to the extent provided by law or unless licensed or otherwise authorized by the
Office of Foreign Assets Control: the provision, exportation, or reexportation, directly or
indirectly, of goods, services (except for financial services), or technology in support of
exploration or production for deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects that have the
potential to produce oil in the Russian Federation, or in maritime area claimed by the
Russian Federation and extending from its territory, and that involve any person
determined to be subject to this Directive, its property, or its interests in property.26
According to Jeff Barnett, Senior Director of Policy and Programs at the US – Russian
Business Council, 90% of Russia’s technology used in the energy sector, including 30% of
refinery equipment, is imported from the US. This technology is not only essential to maintain
existing projects but also for exploration and innovation. Although Russia’s energy sector is
deeply integrated with the European market, its dependence on advanced American technology
makes US trade relations essential for oil and gas development. For example, when Chevron
signed the agreement with Russia to expand the Caspian Pipeline Consortium in 2011, the
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company provided the initial $2.7 billion needed for construction to begin.27 Since that was an
existing project unrelated to deep water, Arctic or shale projects, it has not been shut down by
the sanctions. On the contrary, ExxonMobil’s 2011 agreement with Rosneft, Russia’s largest oil
company was intended for Arctic Ocean, Black Sea and Siberian exploration. Additionally, the
deal gave Rosneft a large stake in Exxon’s deep water drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. This would
allow Rosneft to learn about deep water drilling and fracking to use at home based projects.28
Over 20% of Russia’s oil comes from deep water or “tight” reserves that are accessed through
powerful and mostly US made pumps. Russia’s reliance on US technology has delayed urgency
to develop its own, making its energy companies vulnerable to the US sanctions. Although
Exxon continued drilling in the Kara Sea even after the first sanctions were enforced, in
September 2014 the company announced that it was officially pulling out of the project.29 This
means that Rosneft is no longer able to continue exploration of Arctic oil drilling until sanctions
are lifted, Russia is able to develop its own advanced technology or get it from somewhere else.
Additionally, pulling out of the project signified a set-back in closer US – Russian relations in
the energy sector including a potential $500 billion investment loss, with $51.7 billion just in
2015.30
Another company that has had to begin pulling out is Schlumberger who partnered with
Russia on several projects, including the Achinsk oil refining factory which is owned by Rosneft.
Schlumberger laid off nearly 10,000 employees working in the Russian region during 2014 as
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production slowed down.31 Although it is difficult to distinguish between effects of the
international sanctions, Russia’s currency crisis and falling oil prices, Rosneft’s profit of 1
billion rubles in the third quarter of 2014 as opposed to 173 billion rubles in the second quarter
demonstrated a significant loss.32 Additionally, Rosneft’s debt of over $40 billion dollars resulted
in severe impact as the company tried to pay it back in accordance with sanction enforcements.
However, inability to tap into Western capital has made it extremely difficult for investments and
payments to proceed as US regulators are rejecting and freezing finances.
Executive Order 13685 states the prohibition of “any approval, financing, facilitation, or
guarantee by a United States person, wherever located, of a transaction by a foreign person
where the transaction by that foreign person would be prohibited by this section if performed by
a United States person or within the United States.”33 This suggests ambiguity since all
worldwide locations are presumed to be under the jurisdiction of the sanction. For example, the
launch of the Yamal LNG plant in Russia’s Arctic was postponed due to issues with obtaining
financial support and technological material from US companies and European partners such as
Total, a multinational integrated oil and gas company located in France, as well as the sanctions
against Gennady Timchenko, co-owner of Novatek, the controlling shareholder of the project.34
In September 2014, Total’s CFO, Patric de la Chevardière stated that "the effect of U.S.
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sanctions was that Yamal LNG will be prevented from raising any dollar financing.”35
Additionally, in 2013 General Electric signed a $600 million deal contract to provide key turbo
machinery equipment for the project in Russian Siberia but had to terminate the contract.36
Russia’s inability to obtain the necessary US technology to continue construction was another
crucial factor that ultimately terminated progress of the Yamal LNG plant. Furthermore, the
cancellation of the project illustrates how US dominance in the global market gives it the ability
to enforce bilateral laws and regulations onto third parties such as in this case with Total.
Furthermore, in 2015 the world’s largest gas extractor company, Gazprom, called off the
South Stream Project which was set to run through Bulgaria to deliver gas to Europe. In addition
to a lack of Western technology needed for the project, Gazprom was not able to raise the
funding needed. Nearly 80% of Gazprom’s long term loans come from US banks, including JP
Morgan, while the rest are from Europe and other countries.37 Consequently, the expenses of the
pipeline would require Gazprom to take out more long term loans, most likely in dollars.
Furthermore, Bulgaria was waiting for a funding approval to participate in the project as well.
However, due to sanctions from the US and the EU, Bulgaria was not able to obtain the approval
and the project was forced to get called off. As a result, Bulgaria lost nearly 6,000 new jobs and
$3 billion in investment.38 Although not stated explicitly, it is implied that the absence of US
technology and funding, in addition to political pressure, was a significant factor that led to the
Daniel Gilbert and Selina Williams, “Total Looks to China to Finance Russian Gas Projects Amid
Sanctions,” The Wall Street Journal, last modified September 22, 2014,
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cancellation of the project. Aside from hurting potential profits for Gazprom, the US
extraterritorial jurisdiction extended to Bulgaria by forcing them to pull out of the project.
B. The Financial Sector
Although financial investments in energy projects inevitably have affected the financial
sector, specific financial institutions and the overall economy have felt the impact of sanctions
due to Russia’s current isolation from the Western financial market. Although GDP only shrank
by -.9% in the first half of 2016 as opposed to -3.7% in 2015, the recession has persisted and
higher borrowing costs along with limited growth prospects continue to overshadow the
economy.39 The financial sector remains vulnerable due to negative credit quality and higher
pressure to pay back debt quickly.40 Since 2014, the Russian government has made efforts to
execute a policy to fix the economic situation, including decreases in various areas of
government spending and continuous withdrawals from the Reserve Fund. As a result of the
Reserve Fund depleting, the federal government debt is expected to increase.41 Additionally,
Russia’s strong integration between politics and the energy sector has had severe impacts on its
economy.
Russia’s top billionaires are leaders in energy companies and close allies of President
Putin. Bank Rossiya, which is considered to be the “personal bank” of Putin’s inner circle, holds
nearly $11 billion in assets of Putin’s closest friends.42 After sanctions were enacted, over $640
million in assets of Russian individuals and entities were frozen in US bank accounts, $572
million of which were from Bank Rossiya. Other banks targeted by the sanctions were Russia’s
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top lenders Sberbank, VTB Bank and Gazprombank. Sberbank, which holds 30% of Russia’s
assets, reported a net loss of 20% for 2014 and that its cost of risk went up from 2.3 to 3.5%. 43
This was largely a result of funding costs that have drastically risen since the ruble lost value and
Russian banks were cut off from Western loans altogether. Gazprombank also reported a net loss
of $260 million during the first quarter of 2015, stating that the bank was forced to put a vast
amount of rubles aside to buy dollars and pay for bad loans to the US.44 Additionally, VTB
Bank, Russia’s biggest lender, reported that their profits plummeted to $13.1 million during 2014
and experienced net losses throughout 2015, reportedly due to sanctions and the central banks
high interest rates.45 In early March 2015 Chief Executive of VTB Bank, Andrei Kostin, stated,
“Sanctions have changed the vector of movement of my bank. Before, I was able to develop it on
the free market, to borrow on global markets, sell shares, but the sanctions have made all that
impossible.”46 Although it can be argued that both US and EU sanctions are responsible, the
VTB Bank’s significant partnerships with energy companies such as Rosneft, imply that dollars
are essential to the VTB Bank’s success and played a large role in its losses.
Due to the strong integration of the energy and financial sectors in Russia, the sanctions
have created many secondary effects between banks, companies and foreign investment. Most
importantly, inability to complete transactions with the US dollar has caused severe issues for
banks and oil companies, especially since oil is globally traded in dollars. The sectoral sanctions

Oksana Kobzeva and Alexander Winning, “Update 3 – Russia’s Sberbank Sees Margin Squeeze
Worsening in 2015,” Reuters, last modified March 26, 2015,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/26/russia-sberbank-results-idUSL6N0WS1OE20150326
44
Peter Hobson, “Crisis Turns Profit to Loss at Russia’s No. 3 Bank Gazprombank,” The Moscow Times,
last modified April 21, 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/crisis-turns-profit-to-lossat-russia-s-no-3-bank-gazprombank/519439.html
45
Alexander Kolyandr, “Russia’s VTB Bank Sees Profits Plunge in 2014,” The Wall Street Journal, last
modified March 13, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-vtb-bank-sees-profits-plunge-in-20141426241464
46
Ibid.
43

enforced by the US aimed to cut off Russia’s access to Western capital markets, causing Russian
banks and companies to turn to the domestic money supply. Derivative 1 of Executive Order
13662 states:
The following activities by a U.S. person or within the United States are prohibited,
except to the extent provided by law or unless licensed or otherwise authorized by the
Office of Foreign Assets Control: (1) all transactions in, provision of financing for, and
other dealings in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity or new equity of persons
determined to be subject to this Directive, their property, or their interests in property. 47
The “30 day maturity” provision has created numerous issues since long term loans from
Western banks are no longer available. Prior to the sanctions, Russian banks took out money
from Western banks and redistributed that money in loans to Russian companies. However, now
companies, such as Rosneft, are no longer able to take out new loans therefore slowing down
expansion of Russian businesses and integration into the world market. Consequently, loans are
not able to be refinanced, urging companies and banks to pay back existing loans as soon as
possible. For example, Rosneft had about $60 billion in debt and was set to pay about $20 billion
dollar denominated debt by the end of 2015.48 Since the company was not allowed to refinance
loans, it was forced to pay its debt at a faster rate which resulted in profit losses and stalled
company expansion. Furthermore, toward the end of 2014 the ruble devaluated to its lowest of
80 to the dollar, contributing to rising debt. For example, another major energy company that
was hit with the same circumstances was Gazprom for which debt burden increased by 14% in
2015.49
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Since banks have not been able to borrow more money from the US, the Russian Central
Bank has had to finance loans by taking out money from foreign exchange reserves. From 2014
to 2015, reserves decreased from nearly $480 billion to $350 billion in less than a year. In 2015,
Russia had over $670 billion of corporate debt denominated in foreign currencies, $120 million
of which was scheduled to mature later that year.50 According to Jeff Barnett, since foreign
exchange reserves significantly decreased, Russia no longer has a “cushion” to fall back on.51
Furthermore, the Russian government began using the National Welfare Fund, a section of the
foreign exchange reserves that is meant to fund the pension system. Additionally, interest rates
have gone up from 5.5% to as high as 17%, making foreign investment expensive and
unappealing. Consequently, investor confidence has significantly gone down since the beginning
of the Ukraine crisis with the top concern being political risk.52 In 2014, US investors pulled out
nearly $100 billion out of Russia.53 Since Russia’s investment segment is mostly based on
dollars due to the energy sector, investment pull out has had detrimental effects on Russia’s
economy. In early 2015, Standard and Poor’s, an American based financial services company,
gave Russia a credit rating of “junk status.” 54 Aside from resulting in a large investment drop, the
rating meant that if Russia tried to borrow money from the global market, its rates were much
higher due to “financial risk.”
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DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION OF EFFECTS
A. The Energy Sector
One of the most significant implications of the effects is that the energy sector is deeply
integrated with the economy. As a result of the direct correlation between the devaluation of the
ruble and the fluctuation in oil prices, vulnerabilities in Russia’s political and economic structure
have been exposed and emphasized, specifically its dependence on energy exports. Although the
oil prices inevitably affected the energy sector, the specific projects mentioned earlier clearly
demonstrate the effects of the sanctions. Due to several cancelled projects, Russia has had to start
looking for partners elsewhere to help the sector recover. One of the most important partnerships
has been with China. In 2014, Russia signed two separate deals with China, including a $400
billion gas deal. The deal consists of Russian oil firm Gazprom supplying China with nearly 30
billion cubic meters of gas over a 30 year period.55 It also includes construction of a new
pipeline that will carry gas from the Eastern Siberia region. Furthermore, the closer ties have the
potential of making China Russia’s biggest gas market as opposed to Germany.
Russia has also deepened its relationship with Iran by negotiating a deal to build
hydroelectric plants and increase oil exports. The multi-billion dollar oil agreement between
Moscow and Tehran is set to reach nearly $2.35 billion a year.56 The contracts with China and
Iran illustrate Russia’s ability to partially substitute Western markets in energy exports. Although
it is arguable that the new deals cannot replace the capacity of the European market and fully
help recover the energy sector, it demonstrates that Russia can diversify its energy supply

Jason Bordoff and Trevor Houser, “American Gas to the Rescue?” Columbia Center on Global Energy
Policy, last modified September 2014,
http://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/energy/CGEP_American%20Gas%20to%20the%20R
escue%3F.pdf
56
“Sanctioned Russia and Iran sign 5-yr Deal to Ease Western Pressure,” RT, last modified August 8,
2014, http://rt.com/business/178316-russia-iran-oil-deal-sanctions/
55

market. Furthermore, Russia successfully changed the South Stream to the Turkish Stream
pipeline project since Turkey is not a member of the EU and does not fall under the jurisdiction
of the US or EU sanctions. Greece also agreed to invest $2 billion in the project, helping the
financial gap created by lack of US dollars.57 This means that aside from establishing stronger
investments in countries such as China and Iran, Russia is still maintaining its presence in
Europe for the long term.
In addition to finding alternative trading partners, Europe’s dependence on Russian
energy has started relieving its sanctions on Russia’s top oil and gas companies such as
Gazprom.58 Additionally, despite the EU’s strategic transatlantic partnership with the US, it has
been hesitant to enforce stricter sanction measures against Russia. Overall, energy exports have
continued to flow into Europe since there are no other substantive alternatives and the US is not
able to substitute Russia’s energy supply. Consequently, Russia’s energy sector has not felt
significant impact in regards to existing energy trade. However, the US’s ban on “exploration”
such as deep water, Arctic and shale drilling prevents companies from expansion and growth.
The US’s vast supply of technology is vital to such projects and has inevitably caused a setback
in Russia’s plans to expand its energy sector. Currently, 90% of Russia’s energy technology
comes from the US, 30% of it being advanced technology for deep water oil exploration.59 This
has allowed the US to use extraterritorial jurisdiction by impacting what Russian companies and
even its trading partners can or cannot due in the Arctic and other forms of energy development.
Additionally, absence of US investment in the energy sector has played a significant role in the
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cancelled projects. However, the effects of the sanctions have also given Russia incentive to start
developing the necessary technology domestically or obtain it from somewhere else as well as
use domestic and other outside resources for financing the projects. Although this will be a long
and difficult transition, according to Jeff Barnett, it can be done. Overall, Russia has experienced
significant setbacks in the energy sector including inability to expand and replace its dependence
on Europe for trade. However, it has been able to find alternatives while raising oil and gas
production.
B. The Financial Sector
Although some of the effects of the energy and financial sectors inevitably integrate,
significant profit losses in the Russian banking system and issues with long term dollar lending
indicate that the financial sector has been hit much harder. The initial asset freezes did not do
much damage while continuing problems with the banking system have. One of the main issues
is that there are many secondary effects that have potential long term impact. For example, since
Russia’s reserves are rapidly depleting and its Western finances are vastly cut off, the
government does not have a concrete back up if the ruble and GDP continue to fall. Furthermore,
diminished investor confidence and the “junk status” rating have caused huge financial issues as
investors have persistently pulled out of the Russian economy. A poll indicated that investor
confidence fell from 56% in 2014 to 25% in January 2015.60
According to Kerry Contini, an associate at Baker and McKenzie LLP, one of the most
severe impacts of the sanctions is that investors do not want to work with Russian companies
even if they are not sanctioned and the transactions are legal, “Companies do not want to have to
do the due diligence or risk the possibility of facing legal repercussions and penalties since it is
not always clear exactly who is involved in a transaction and where the final product will end up.
60
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It is simply easier and more cost effective for US companies to pause investment all together.” 61
Another consequence is that investor confidence and credit rating are long term effects that are
very difficult to get back. Since a vast amount of Russia’s investment is dominated by dollars,
inability to access Western markets has been detrimental. Rosneft was set to buy Morgan
Stanley’s oil trading unit last year. However, the sanctions created barriers by making it
extremely difficult for Rosneft to find the billions of dollars in credit needed to run the operation
as well as approval to let the transaction go through. As a result, the deal was called off in
December 2014.62
Russia’s isolation from Western capital has also prevented its ability to turn to
international organizations for help. Typically, countries in situations similar to Russia would be
able to request assistance from the World Bank and IMF. However, since the US is a dominant
member and contributor to these organizations, Russia cannot use their services because it will
most likely be rejected. In March 2015, the US increased its dollar shares in the international
reserves to 62.9%, further indicating the dependency of international organizations on the dollar.
This also meant that US influence holds a strong presence in these organizations indicating that
the World Bank and the IMF would not go against the US, or even Europe, to help Russia. 63 In
an effort to reduce dollar dependence, Russia has turned to domestic financial resources for
bailout. Aside from using the Russian Central Bank reserves, the government has initiated steps
toward creating a national payment system owned by the bank. This has even affected US

61

Kerry Contini, interview with associate at Baker and McKenzie, May 8, 2017.
Paul Whitfield, “As Russia M&A Stalls, Company’s Founder on Sanctions and Oil Prices,” The Deal,
last modified February 20, 2015, http://www.thedeal.com/content/energy/as-russian-ma-stalls-companiesfounder-on-sanctions-and-oil-prices.php
63
Daniel Bases, “U.S. Dollar Increases Share of Central Bank FX Reserves,” Reuters, last modified
March 31, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/31/currency-reserves-imfidUSL2N0WX11U20150331
62

companies, such as Visa and MasterCard who account for 95% of Russia’s payment services. 64
After US sanctions were initially enforced, Visa and MasterCard were forced to freeze its
services for a few days, causing major transactional issues. Although the companies were
granted permission to continue their services, the incident urged Russia to move towards a
national payment system in order to avoid such vulnerabilities in the future. In early April 2015,
Visa and MasterCard officially began processing payments inside Russia’s domestic system.65
Additionally, since the beginning of the sanctions, Chinese and Japanese bank card
systems UnionPay and Japan Credit Bureau entered the Russian market. Russia and China also
tightened their relations by announcing that they will be using their own currencies for bilateral
trade.66 However, China is extremely dependent on US capital as well. In 2012, 175.6% of
China’s trade surplus was related to sales to the US.67 Consequently, despite Russia and China’s
initiatives to integrate their markets and decrease reliance on the US, both countries depend on
the dollar which will be extremely difficult to change. Overall, the dollar’s strong presence in the
global market has not only affected Russia’s ability to access the US financial system, but the
European and Asian markets as well. Although these appear as positive opportunities for Russia
to diversify its financial market, it will take a while to see the success of the national payment
system. Furthermore, this does not substitute Russia’s dependence on dollar loans for its energy
sector from US, European and even Asian banks. According to the National Bureau of Economic
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Research, a large share of dollar denominating lending is done by non-US banks, particularly
European banks.68 Since Russia receives over half of its loans from the EU, the banking system
still depends on dollars for lending and transactions, especially for oil and gas. Although this can
change, it would take a long time to completely shift Russia’s financial structure away from
Western capital.
C. Further Implications
One of the main implications of the effects on the Russian financial sector is the
consequences of a dollar dominated global financial system and how that enables the US to use
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Although Russia’s inability to access the dollar is not necessarily the
main reason for its economic downturn, it plays an important role considering Russia’s
dependence on dollar denominated loans and energy trade. Similarly, other foreign markets have
had economic issues when US financing was cut off. Considering the integration of the dollar in
the European banking system and countries such as China, it can be assumed that without the
dollar, the banking sectors would not succeed. In general, the dollar’s presence in nearly every
market, especially international reserves and lending systems, makes it a vital factor for
economic stability and success. Furthermore, the dollar based international system gives the US
ability to exert power onto foreign financial sectors and overall country regulations. For
example, in 2009 as a result of the US sanctions imposed on Iran, foreign banks, such as London
based Lloyds TSB Bank, were forced to pay fines to the US government for clearing dollar
transactions on behalf of Iranian banks.69
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It is arguable that energy dependent countries such as Russia and Iran are especially
vulnerable to dollar dominance since oil is globally traded in dollars. Given that a vast amount of
Russia’s financial sector is designated for lending to Russian energy companies and conducting
transactions for energy trade, access to the dollar is imperative and was inevitably what hurt the
economy after the sanctions were enforced. Additionally, the dollar’s prevalence in the European
market gave the US more leverage in establishing a concrete transatlantic partnership with the
EU against Russia. However, experts have started to question how much longer the US dollar
dominance era will last. In fact, many are arguing that the US sanctions enforced on Russia are
backfiring by giving Moscow incentive to partner with countries such as China and Iran in
moving away from dollar dependence. Nevertheless, as the dollar has gained strength in the last
several months, it is evident that it still signifies power and supremacy in the current financial
market. 70 Despite these implications, I would argue that the dollar does not give US leverage in
bargaining with Russia in the Ukraine crisis. Despite the effects described in this paper, the
sanctions have not been effective in forcing Russia to comply with US demands. As of now, the
US does not plan on lifting the sanctions unless Russia fulfills the Mink Agreement by giving
back Crimea and Russia does not plan on complying.
THE RUSSIA AND CHINA PARTNERSHIP
As Russia continues to recover and stabilize its economy, China has become a critical
ally in Russia’s economic development and its participation in international legal issues since the
2014 sanctions. The economic turmoil following the Ukraine crisis pushed Russia to “pivot” its
economy towards Asia and form a stronger partnership with its neighboring giant, especially due
to Russia’s inability to obtain Western capital. Although China has largely remained neutral in
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regards to Crimea, China’s alliance with Russia has protected Russia from the full impact of
Western sanctions and given the annexation of Crimea international legitimacy. 71 As a result,
both countries have taken key steps to influence international affairs through increased economic
and political relations.
Russia’s lack of access to Western capital has led it to seek a substitute from China
through various trade agreements. One of the most profound developments was Russia and
China’s declaration that they would be using the yuan for transactions. In 2014 People’s Bank of
China and the Central Bank of Russia signed an arrangement for currency swap worth 150
billion yuan and 815 billion rubles to facilitate settlement in national currencies and boost
international trade.72 Additionally, Russia has begun issuing yuan denominated bonds which
marks Russia’s return to the bond market since 2013.73 The bonds have been issued with
Russia’s state owned Gazprombank which was a large target of the US and EU sanctions.74
Consequently, China has become one of Russia’s largest investors, providing Russia with a
substitute since Western investors rapidly started pulling out due to the sanctions.
In 2014, Russia and China ratified the Strategic Partnership agreement from which
various substantial trade deals emerged.75 The most important result was the strengthening of the
Sino-Russian energy relationship, including a 40-year gas supply agreement between Gazprom
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and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). 76 This included a $400 billion deal to build
a gas pipeline which was an important post-Crimea decision. Russia and China had begun the
negotiating process before 2014 but were unable to agree on a price.77 With Gazprom taking a
large hit as a result of the US and EU sanctions, Russia sought China’s help and this was a key
development for creating an alternative for one of Russia’s largest energy players. Additionally,
Rosneft entered into a deal with CNPC to supply oil worth up to $500 billion from Russia’s oil
fields.78 Furthermore, Russia’s exports of mechanical and technical products to China increased
by nearly 45%, signifying Russia’s evolving shift to non-energy products.79 Finally, both
countries have taken steps to integrate Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union and China’s BRI,
which is comprised of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, to
establish an “inward-focused trading network.”80 Ultimately, these developments suggest
Russia’s developing response to the sanctions since oil prices fell and fluctuated, leading to a
decline in Russia’s GDP, and the need for the country to explore alternatives to help its economy
recover.
In addition to stronger economic relations, Russia and China have taken significant steps
to strengthen their political relationship by supporting each other, or remaining silent, in current
legal global issues. Rather than joining Western powers in condemning Russia’s annexation of
Crimea, China took a silent position and remained neutral.81 However, this “neutrality” was a
clear signal that China was not going to turn its back on Russia and continue a relationship with
its neighboring giant. Additionally, although Russia and China have historically taken an allied

76

Ibid.
Angela Stent
78
Bob Savic
79
Ibid.
80
Ibid.
81
Ibid.
77

approach to veto the United Nations Security Council’s legislation concerning the Bashar alAssad’s Syrian regime, this has become even more evident following Crimea as China has taken
a more “forward” role in engaging in Syria.82 In fact, China has provided Syria with military
training and humanitarian aid.83 Furthermore, China and Russia have vetoed key UN Security
Council resolutions, backed by Western powers, to sanction Syria over its chemical weapons
use.84 This has signified a huge shift since the 2013 plans by the Russians and Americans to get
rid of chemical weapons in Syria and simultaneously shows Russia and Chinas commitment to
remain united, pitted against Western powers.85 Furthermore, China’s veto suggested its neutral,
if not supportive, position in regards to Russia’s involvement in Syria which has been
condemned by the West. The countries’ also vetoed a UN resolution calling for the crisis in Syria
to be referred to the International Criminal Court.86 As a result, Russia and China have faced
strong criticism for allowing the Syrian government to “escape accountability for war crimes and
crimes against humanity.”87 Finally, the UN Security Council has become a powerful tool for the
neighboring giants in preventing US led global policymaking and the divided interests in
addressing current legal issues.
Another area of cooperation has been in the South China Sea, a historically controversial
legal issue for China over ownership and interstate conflict. In 2016, Russia and China
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conducted an eight day naval exercise, Joint Sea 2016, in the South China Sea, showing Russia’s
clear support for China’s claims in the region and prevention of influence from outside powers,
specifically the US.88 This maritime strategy shows several political motives, including Russia’s
desire for greater influence in the Asia-Pacific against US attacks. Additionally, it has also
contributed to Russia’s desire to expand outside of its energy exports by providing military
equipment to China and participating in the exercises. As a result, the South China Sea presents a
higher overarching issue of international law, which China seems to be ignoring with Russia’s
support. In December 2016, China seized a US Navy unnamed underwater vehicle in the South
China Sea.89 Combined with Russia’s support, this suggests a pattern of disregard among major
military powers of international law. If the exercises continue and China keeps testing its
boundaries in the South China Sea, this could lead to significant international legal issues with
Russia and China being the regional superpowers against the US’s interests in the matter.
Another important collaboration between Russia and China since the 2014 Ukraine crisis
is their joint rejection of several international institutions. In 2016 Russia withdrew from the
International Criminal Court, following the court’s earlier ruling that the annexation by Russia of
Crimea was an “ongoing occupation.”90 With several African nations withdrawing prior to
Russia’s announcement, and countries such as China rejecting membership outright, the court
suffered a significant setback in its mission to establish global legitimacy and effectiveness. 91
Additionally, China has rejected the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration regarding the

88

Bob Savic
Ibid.
90
Anna Holligan, “Russia Withdraws From International Criminal Court Treaty,” BBC, last modified
Nov 16, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38005282
91
Ibid.
89

South China Sea in The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China.92 China has
also steered away from abiding by the UN’s Convention on the Law of the Sea and threatened to
leave the convention.93 Consequently, this undermines the convention and court’s primary
methods for resolving disputes. Furthermore, the countries’ actions have exposed the
fundamental weakness of the process in international law which is that if a state declines to
appear in court, the tribunals have no power to make it change its behavior. When such important
players pay no regard to an organization’s dispute resolution forums, less powerful countries
have little incentive to submit to the court’s jurisdiction.
In addition to rejecting international law authority, in 2016 Russia and China issued their
own Joint Declaration on Promotion and Principles of International Law. The three main
principles covered by the declaration is sovereign equality of states, the non-use and noninterference in internal affairs and peaceful resolution of states.94 An overarching theme of the
declaration is countering criticism that both countries have ignored and violated international
law, including the South China Sea and Crimea. This entails strong emphasis on the importance
of state sovereignty in international law which is likely directed at preventing Western influence.
It also discusses state immunity, particularly aimed at human-rights based restrictions. As a
result, the countries, again, questioned the legitimacy of international law enforcement and its
effect on countries’ actions.95 Although the declaration does not explicitly reject international
organizations, the declaration does serve as a joint effort by two major power giants in
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contradiction to the principles promoted by the West. Aside from continuing to undermine the
authority of international organizations, the declaration symbolizes both countries’ continuous
and stronger effort to keep the West, especially the US, out of its regional affairs. Regardless of
the legislative effect that this declaration may have, the message is clear: Russia and China are
partners and will not succumb to Western demands.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the US and EU sanctions following the 2014 Ukraine crisis had a
significant and detrimental effect on Russia’s economy. Specifically, the lack of access to
Western capital severely impacted Russia’s energy and financial sectors. Without the US dollar,
Russian banks were unable to finance energy projects which are the main source of revenue for
Russia’s economy. Aside from causing investors to pull out and decreasing the GDP, the
sanctions have also pushed Russia to explore substitutes, especially China. Since 2014, the
countries have substantially increased trade, including various energy deals and currency swap
agreements. In addition to strengthening its economic partnership, China and Russia have also
allied politically, largely to resist Western influence in their region. They have also collaborated
in military exercises, voting in the UN Security Council and raising legitimacy questions of
international organizations. Although the partnership is far from perfect and presents its own
issues, China and Russia’s most similar interests to maintain state sovereignty and keep the US
out of regional affairs suggests that the partnership will continue to grow.

